

# SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA INTERNET FREEDOM LANDSCAPE

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<https://www.opentech.fund/page/open-technology-fund>

Projects and Reports.

- <https://www.opentech.fund/project/sub-saharan-africa-cyber-threat-modeling>
- <https://www.opentech.fund/article/angola-emerging-battleground-digital-rights>
- <https://www.opentech.fund/article/new-report-investigates-internet-censorship-during-rwandas-2017-presidential-election>
- <https://www.opentech.fund/article/new-report-analyzes-internet-censorship-during-lesothos-2017-general-elections>

# Agenda

- **Internet Governance Environment**
- **Regional Forums, standard-setting/norm sharing**
- **Domestic Information Controls**
- **Deliberate Network Interference (OONI/Shutdowns)**
- **Network Landscape**
- **Legal and Regulatory Frameworks**

# Mapping the Internet Governance Environment

- States preference of multilateralism versus multistakeholder (ism).
- Lack of clarity in government department, public and private sector roles
- Side-lining of civil society, weakened leverage
- Government preference of political economy and other lesser security issues

# Regional Forums, standard-setting/norm sharing

- Coordinate policies and practices, and are vehicles through which repressive countries learn from each other
- Details about what goes on in ‘security’ forums is difficult to discern from outside
- Policing, militarisation and securitisation of the internet.
- Practices reflected at National levels

# Domestic Information Controls

- Technically aided by the increasing cyber espionage and the market for surveillance
- Legally aided by the proliferating cybercrime laws
- Politically-motivated information security threats
- CSOs, unlike corporate entities, have little or no capacity to deal with the problem
- These capabilities are proving particularly attractive to many regimes that face on-going insurgencies & popular protests.

# Domestic Information Controls

- “Surveillance-by-design” infrastructure development projects
- Political intent –v- human rights & security in app design, data centre, IXP & network protocols.
- Opportunities and risks of digital economies for Africa
- Log but don’t block: Surveillance & computational propaganda
- Application of non-technical measures
- “Downloading” policing of the Internet to the private sector

# Deliberate Network Interferences

- Blocking and Filtering of Content
- The work of the Open Network Observatory for Network Interference (OONI)
- What OONI measurements tell us about network interference
- Internet shutdowns: Causes, motivations, impact, campaigns



# Mapping Network Landscape

- Institutional and policy mapping (government, IXPs, ISPs/telcos, GAFAM, SMEs, policy, entrepreneurs)
- Political economy of African national cybersecurity policies (including funding, tech flows)
- Monopoly, convergence and downloading

# The Legal and Regulatory Frameworks

- Growing national security awareness and other cyber risks
- Cybersecurity capacity is generally limited in Africa
- Implementation is a significant challenge with governments and law enforcement
- Fear to engage academics and technologists

# Specific laws of concern

- Anti-terrorism laws: Ethiopia, Kenya
- Criminalisation of hate speech, slander, defamation and other forms of critical speech
- Penalising/imposing fees for social media use
- Cyber security legislation

# Sub-Saharan Africa Threat Modelling

## Current project

- Who do you think I should talk to?
- What information do you think I should get?
- What support can I get from the USG towards my research, e.g, in-country contacts?
- What do the USG and other stakeholders need?